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A MODEST PROPOSAL:
ABOLISHING AGENCY INDEPENDENCE IN
FREE ENTERPRISE FUND V. PCAOB
Neomi Rao*
Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 1
outlines a modest proposal for abolishing agency independence. The U.S.
Supreme Court’s decision creates a framework for challenging the
constitutionality of agency independence and the restrictions on removal
that shield the heads of independent agencies from presidential oversight.
In the course of assessing the constitutionality of the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB or Board), the Court provides the
reasoning for undermining most forms of agency independence. Yet the
potential scope of the decision has gone largely unnoticed. Most
commentators have pronounced the decision insignificant for presidential
authority. This Article questions the conventional interpretation and
demonstrates that the structure of the Court’s argument, which focuses on
the importance of presidential control and accountability through the
removal power, logically calls into question the constitutionality of agency
independence. Moreover, the Court’s remedy of severing invalid for-cause
removal limits provides a workable approach for future cases—eliminating
agency independence without eliminating the independent agencies.
Free Enterprise Fund raises a question of first impression: may
executive branch officers, such as members of the PCAOB, be insulated
from the President’s oversight and removal power by two layers of tenure
protection? The PCAOB was created by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
(the Act) 2 in response to a number of high-profile corporate and accounting
scandals. The Act gives the Board wide-ranging authority over accounting
firms that audit publicly held companies.3 Under the Act, Commissioners
of the Securities and Exchange Commission (Commission or SEC) appoint
members of the Board and Board members can be removed by

* Assistant Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law. For their helpful
comments, I thank Jonathan Adler, Ross Davies, Gary Lawson, John Manning, Gillian
Metzger, Aaron Saiger, Peter Strauss, Robert Vaughn, Stephen Vladeck, Todd Zywicki, and
participants at the Fordham Law School Symposium on “Presidential Influence over
Administrative Action” and the Judges and Judging Workshop at American University
Washington College of Law.
1. 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010).
2. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745.
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7211–7215 (2006) (outlining the responsibilities of the Board).
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Commissioners only “for good cause shown.” 4 The Commissioners, in
turn, can be removed by the President only for inefficiency, neglect of duty,
or malfeasance in office—creating the double for-cause removal protection
over the Board. The Court holds this double layer contravenes separation
of powers because the President “cannot ‘take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed’ if he cannot oversee the faithfulness of the officers who
execute them.” 5
The Court emphasizes that the Board enjoys an unusual double layer of
for-cause removal protection and purports to limit the scope of its decision
to this arrangement. 6 Nonetheless, in the course of reaching its conclusion,
the Court articulates a series of principles, a sort of proof, for the
unconstitutionality of agency independence. Writing for the 5-4 majority,
Chief Justice John Roberts calls the question presented a “modest” one that
does not challenge for-cause limitations in general.7 Yet the Chief Justice
answers the modest question with ambitious constitutional principles that
logically challenge most for-cause removal restrictions. The Court’s
reasoning strongly suggests that statutory limits on the President’s removal
power, such as those protecting the officers of the independent agencies, are
unconstitutional.
The Court articulates three fundamental principles that lead to its
conclusion that the Act’s for-cause removal provisions are unconstitutional:
First, the Court establishes that the President must oversee the work of
the executive branch. This premise stems from separation of powers, the
vesting of the executive power in the President, and the singular
responsibility of the President to the people for the faithful execution of the
laws. 8
Second, the Court argues that presidential oversight requires the capacity
to remove subordinate officers. The President cannot fully oversee
subordinate officers if he cannot remove them from office when they fail to
faithfully execute the law. For the President to be held accountable for the
work of the executive branch, he must be able to hold his subordinates
accountable, by removal if necessary. Other methods of control cannot
substitute for the removal power. 9
Third, a statute cannot diminish or modify the President’s removal
power, because removal provides a key constitutional means for the
President to resist legislative encroachments and ensure adequate control
over the executive branch. 10
QED: From these general principles, the Court concludes that the
Board’s two layers of for-cause removal protection are unconstitutional. As
a remedy, however, the Court does not enjoin the operations of the Board.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Id. § 7211(e)(6); see also id. § 7217(d)(3).
Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3147 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II).
Id. at 3147.
Id. at 3157.
Id. at 3151–57. See infra Part II.A.
Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3158–59. See infra Part II.B.
Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3154 n.4. See infra Part II.C.
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Instead, it severs the for-cause removal protections that insulate the Board
from the Commission. 11
As a result of the Court’s decision, the Board can proceed with its
statutory functions, but with the possibility of at-will removal by the SEC.
The SEC Commissioners, however, can be removed by the President only
for cause, as the parties to the case stipulated. The Court decides the case
with this understanding and does not reexamine the precedents upholding
single layer restrictions on the President’s removal power. 12 Therefore, the
Court leaves Board members subject to removal by the SEC, an
independent agency. The President’s control over the Board only
marginally increases, which leads a number of commentators to call the
case “symbolic”—an insignificant win for proponents of the unitary
executive theory. 13
Yet the Court’s reasoning proves both too much and too little for the case
at hand, which deals with the relatively unusual circumstance of two levels
of for-cause protections insulating the Board. The broad principles about
presidential control over the executive branch go too far for the Court’s
ultimate conclusion that the SEC—an independent agency operating
without full presidential control—may provide constitutionally adequate
oversight for the Board.
The disconnect between the reasoning and the remedy implicitly raises
the question: if two levels are unconstitutional, why not one? The Court’s
only answer to this is that the Court, not the Constitution, has previously
allowed limitations on the President’s removal power: “Since 1789, the
Constitution has been understood to empower the President to keep
[executive] officers accountable—by removing them from office, if
necessary. This Court has determined, however, that this authority is not
without limit.” 14 The Court’s precedents such as Humphrey’s Executor v.
United States 15 and subsequent cases sustained statutory limits on the
President’s removal power. Although these precedents are not challenged
in this case, the Court makes clear that there may be a gap between the
Court’s precedents and the Constitution. The Court’s reasoning fails to
explain how two layers of removal protection differ from one.
This tension in the Court’s opinion sets the foundation for a wider assault
on agency independence. The proof applies logically to the more ordinary
first layer of agency independence. First, the President must oversee
11. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3161–62.
12. Id. at 3147 (“The parties do not ask us to reexamine any of these precedents, and we
do not do so.”).
13. See, e.g., Rick Pildes, The Unitary Executive, Administrative Agencies, and the
Supreme
Court,
BALKINIZATION,
(May
18,
2009,
10:36
AM),
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2009/05/unitary-executive-administrative.html; see infra notes
51–53 and accompanying text.
14. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3146 (emphasis added) (citing Humphrey’s
Executor, 295 U.S. 602, 620 (1935); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926)).
15. 295 U.S. at 628–30 (upholding the constitutionality of statutory limitations on the
President’s removal power with regard to the Commissioners of the Federal Trade
Commission).
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executive branch officials. Second, oversight requires the ability to remove
such officials. Third, the President’s removal power cannot be diminished
or modified by statute. QED: The first layer of agency independence is
unconstitutional because it insulates the heads of independent agencies from
the President’s removal power and consequently contravenes the
constitutional structure that vests the executive power and accountability for
the executive branch in the President. The Court’s logic can lead to the
conclusion that even one layer of for-cause removal protection is
unconstitutional. The proof can be applied beyond the narrow question
presented here to the wider battle over agency independence.
Furthermore, the Court’s severance remedy increases the possibility that
the decision may have a further reach because it separates independence
from the independent agencies. The Court severs the Board’s for-cause
removal protections, which leaves the Board intact, but subject to removal
by the SEC. As the Court explains, “[T]he existence of the Board does not
violate the separation of powers, but the substantive removal restrictions
imposed by [the statute] do.” 16 Similarly, severing one layer of agency
independence would make the officers of an independent agency subject to
at-will removal by the President, but it would not otherwise alter the
statutory responsibilities of the agency. Congress might wish to restructure
agencies that lose their independence, but the judicial remedy would be
relatively narrow; it would bring agencies under presidential control, but
not abolish them altogether. Both the proof and remedy proposed by the
Court resolve the narrow question about the PCAOB, but they gesture
toward more. The Court has made a modest proposal for abolishing agency
independence.
The Chief Justice’s opinion in time may be viewed like Marbury v.
Madison, 17 reaching a narrow result on the immediate controversy at
issue—the Board continues largely as before—while staking out ground for
a judicial incursion against agency independence. As in Marbury, the Chief
Justice could have gone a number of different directions, but the decision
reaches a result that minimizes political opposition, while leaving open the
possibility for more significant impact in future decisions. To see this case
as inconsequential is to miss the forest for the trees.
This Article focuses on the possible implications of Free Enterprise
Fund for the constitutionality of agency independence. 18 The Article first
explains the background of the PCAOB case, the Supreme Court’s decision,
and responses to the case. 19 Next, it sets out the Court’s proof for why the
16. Id. at 3161.
17. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
18. This Article does not take up the broader questions about the appropriate scope of
the removal power, which are discussed in greater detail by other scholars. See generally,
Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws,
104 YALE L.J. 541, 642–45 (1994); Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and
the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2 (1994); Geoffrey P. Miller, Independent
Agencies, 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 41, 42–43; Saikrishna Prakash, New Light on the Decision of
1789, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1021, 1022–23 (2006).
19. See infra Part I.
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Board is unconstitutional and examines how the Court’s focus on formal,
structural principles applies beyond the facts of this case. 20 Then, the
Article explains how the Court’s proof—its emphasis on the importance of
presidential control and accountability—calls into question the
constitutionality of agency independence more generally. 21 Finally, it
presents evidence that the Court may be receptive to reconsidering its
earlier precedents and suggests some implications for future challenges to
the constitutionality of agency independence.
I. BACKGROUND OF FREE ENTERPRISE FUND V. PCAOB AND REACTIONS
TO THE DECISION
A. Summary of the Case
As part of accounting and financial services reforms in the SarbanesOxley Act, Congress created the PCAOB to standardize and regulate the
auditing of public companies. Accounting firms that audit publicly traded
companies must register with the Board22 and must comply with auditing
and other standards issued by the Board. 23 The Board must regularly
inspect registered accounting firms and has authority to conduct
investigations of any action or practice that may violate the Act, the
securities laws, the Board’s rules, or the SEC’s rules. 24 The Board was
modeled on private self-regulatory organizations such as the New York
Stock Exchange, but “[u]nlike the self-regulatory organizations . . . the
Board is a Government-created, Government-appointed entity, with
expansive powers to govern an entire industry.” 25
The Commission appoints the five members of the Board and oversees
their issuance of rules and imposition of sanctions. 26 The Commission can
remove Board members only “for good cause shown” and in accordance
with certain procedures.27 The standard for removal is “unusually high,” as
the Court observed. 28 In order to remove a Board member, the Commission
must make a finding on the record, after notice and opportunity for a
hearing, that (1) the Board member willfully violated the Act, the rules of
the Board, or the securities laws, (2) willfully abused his authority, or (3)
failed to enforce compliance by an accounting firm of relevant statutory
provisions or professional standards. 29
Beckstead and Watts, LLP, a Nevada accounting firm, registered with the
Board. After the Board released a report critical of the firm’s auditing
20. See infra Part II.
21. See infra Part III.
22. 15 U.S.C. § 7212(a) (2006).
23. Id. § 7213(a)(1).
24. Id. §§ 7214–7215.
25. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3147
(2010).
26. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7211(e)(1), 7217(b)–(c).
27. Id. § 7211(e)(6).
28. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3158.
29. 15 U.S.C. § 7217(d)(3).
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procedures, the firm, along with Free Enterprise Fund, a nonprofit
organization, sued the Board and challenged its constitutionality. The two
organizations (petitioners) argued that the Act was unconstitutional because
it violated the Appointments Clause and separation-of-powers principles.
The parties stipulated that the SEC Commissioners could be removed from
office only under the Humphrey’s Executor standard of “inefficiency,
neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.” 30 The Court emphasized that it
decides the case “with that understanding.”31 Moreover, none of the parties
asked the Court to reexamine Humphrey’s Executor or the constitutionality
of the SEC’s independence. 32 Accordingly, the central question in the case
was whether the for-cause limitation on the removal of Board members by
the Commission was constitutional. In particular, petitioners argued that
the Act violated separation of powers by insulating the PCAOB from
presidential oversight, control, and supervision. 33
Moreover, petitioners contended that the Act violated the Appointments
Clause because Board members are principal officers who must be
appointed by the President with the Advice and Consent of the Senate.34
Even if the Board members were treated as inferior officers, Article II
requires their appointment be vested in the “Head” of a “Department,” not
by the majority of Commissioners. 35 Petitioners argued that independent
agencies are not Departments and that the Head of the SEC is its
Chairman. 36 As a remedy, they sought a declaratory judgment that the
Board is unconstitutional and an injunction enjoining further operations of
the Board. The district court rejected these arguments on the merits and
held that the Act was constitutional.37 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia affirmed, 38 with Judge Brett Kavanaugh dissenting. 39
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court reversed in part the Court of
Appeals and held that “the dual for-cause limitations on the removal of
Board members contravened the Constitution’s separation of powers.”40
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts focused on the issue of first
impression presented by the particular structure of the Board, in which its
30. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3148–49. For an interesting discussion of this aspect
of the case see Gary Lawson, Stipulating the Law, 109 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1677014 (arguing contrary to standard American
practice that parties should be able to stipulate legal conclusions).
31. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3149.
32. Id. at 3147 (“The parties do not ask us to reexamine any of these precedents, and we
do not do so.”).
33. Brief for Petitioners at *7–8, Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight
Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010) (No. 08-861), 2009 WL 2247130 at *7–8.
34. Id.
35. Id. at *8.
36. Id.
37. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., No. 06-0217, 2007 WL
891675, at *4, *6 (D.D.C. Mar. 21, 2007).
38. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667, 715 (D.C.
Cir. 2008).
39. Id. at 685 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
40. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3151
(2010).

2011]

ABOLISHING AGENCY INDEPENDENCE

2547

members are protected by two levels of for-cause removal. In the Court’s
precedents, “only one level of protected tenure separated the President from
an officer exercising executive power. It was the President—or a
subordinate he could remove at will—who decided whether the officer’s
conduct merited removal under the good-cause standard.” 41 As the Court
explained, Board members may be removed only for good cause and the
determination over whether good cause exists is vested with the SEC
Commissioners, who may only be removed for cause. “The result is a
Board that is not accountable to the President, and a President who is not
responsible for the Board.” 42 The Court held that the second layer of
protection makes a constitutional difference; two layers of for-cause
protection contravened the constitutional structure of separation of powers
and the vesting of executive power in the President.
As a remedy, the Court held that the for-cause removal protections for
the Board could be severed from the Act. The Board could continue with
its duties, but would be subject to at-will removal by the Commissioners.43
The Court explicitly rejected the petitioners’ other claims. It held that the
Board’s appointment was consistent with the Appointments Clause because
appointment was vested in the Head of a Department, here the
Commissioners of the SEC. The Court rejected the arguments that the
Commission is not a Department, or that the Head must be the Chairman of
the Commission. Because it determined that the for-cause provisions could
be severed, the Court declined to issue the broader declaratory and
injunctive relief sought by petitioners that would have enjoined the
operation of the Board.
Justice Stephen Breyer dissented, joined by Justices John Paul Stevens,
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Sonia Sotomayor, arguing that the second layer
of removal protection “does not significantly interfere with the President’s
‘executive Power,’” and “violates no separation-of-powers principle.”44
Justice Breyer noted that no text, history, or precedent fully answered the
question about the constitutionality of two layers of for-cause removal. 45
Accordingly, the dissent’s functional analysis focused on how the Board
operated and the type of practical control exercised by the Commission.
Justice Breyer explained how the Commission exerted substantial control
over Board activities and why the independence of Board members served
important institutional purposes. Moreover, the dissent criticized the
Court’s decision for being “both imprecise and overly broad.”46 Justice
Breyer argued that the majority’s opinion did not distinguish two layers of
for-cause protection from one layer, 47 and that its decision might affect
hundreds, even thousands of high-level government officials. 48
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 3153.
Id.
Id. at 3161–62.
Id. at 3164 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 3167.
Id. at 3184.
Id. at 3171.
Id. at 3178–80.

2548

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

B. The Reaction
Free Enterprise Fund drew a lot of attention when the Court granted
certiorari and there was much anticipation about the outcome largely for
two reasons. First, the Board regulated a key part of the economy and
controlled the fate of accounting firms nationwide. As a practical matter,
dismantling the Board and its work might have had significant
consequences for the financial industry and for Congress’ attempts at
reform.
Second, from a theoretical perspective, the decision was
anticipated for what it might say with regard to the President’s appointment
and removal powers and separation of powers generally—would the Court
overrule Morrison v. Olson? 49 Would it enjoin the Board because it was
constituted in contravention of the Appointments Clause?
As it turned out, the Court’s decision ultimately generated few headlines.
Commentators almost uniformly found the decision to be of limited
significance, both on a practical level with regard to the operation of the
Board, and on a theoretical level with regard to the constitutionality of the
independent agencies. As to the effect on financial industry regulation, the
Board could continue with its statutory duties because the Court’s remedy
only severed the removal protection of the Board, but otherwise left the
Board intact. The decision left Commissioners free to remove Board
members at will, but most commentators familiar with the workings of the
SEC thought the decision would have little impact on the Board. Rick
Pildes, who filed a brief on behalf of seven former SEC Chairmen, argued
that the victory was “symbolic.” He noted that the decision “has no
practical effect at all on the Sarbanes-Oxley Act; the SEC and the Board
that administers the Act will go on as before.” 50 Professor Pildes also
argued “the decision will change nothing in the on-the-ground relationship
between the SEC and the Board.” 51
David Zaring suggested that the Court “handed petitioners a pretty empty
declaratory victory” and although the remedy was “unconventional,” “it
ma[de] this decision much less dramatic than it threatened to be.”52
Similarly, John Elwood argued that the opinion “won’t have much
immediate effect outside of the PCAOB” and that a ruling on other grounds
would have been “far more disruptive.” 53 Others expressed disappointment
that the Court did not go further toward invalidating the independent
agencies, arguing that Chief Justice Roberts “slapped a bandaid on a gaping
49. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
50. Rick Pildes, The Free Enterprise Decision: A Symbolic Victory for the “Unitary
Executive Branch” Vision of the Presidency, but of Limited Practical Consequence,
BALKINIZATION (June 28, 2010, 11:47 AM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2010/06/freeenterprise-decision-symbolic.html.
51. Id.
52. David Zaring, Goodbye, Old PCAOB, and Hello, New PCAOB, THE
CONGLOMERATE, http://www.theconglomerate.org/2010/06/goodbye-old-pcaob-and-hellonew-pcaob.html (June 28, 2010).
53. John Elwood, Free Enterprise Fund: The Lopez of Separation of Powers Doctrine,
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 28, 2010, 12:31 PM), http://volokh.com/2010/06/28/freeenterprise-fund-the-lopez-of-separation-of-powers-doctrine.
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canyon in the Constitution. The decision is wholly unpersuasive.” 54 In the
initial aftermath of the decision, the widespread conclusion was that the
decision would have a marginal impact on the President’s authority, little
effect on the Board’s operations, and no consequence for the independent
agencies generally.
In the ensuing months, scholars have examined the decision more closely
and focused on particular aspects of the Court’s reasoning, but by and large,
have concluded that the decision has limited significance for separation of
powers and the constitutionality of independent agencies. For instance,
Professor Pildes acknowledged that it is the “most expansive vision of
presidential power over the structure of administrative agencies in perhaps
ninety years” but maintained that the “implications of Free Enterprise Fund
for the more general struggle between Congress and the president over
administration remain obscure because the case presented such an
idiosyncratic context.” 55 Peter Strauss has noted that the case was “hardly
earthshaking” and that the implication of the decision was to “reaffirm the
result in Humphrey’s Executor” because it recognizes that “Congress can
create elements of the executive branch whose heads are removable only
‘for cause.’” 56 Sustaining the PCAOB on this rationale required the Court
to accept the constitutionality of the single for-cause protection of the SEC,
and therefore reaffirmed the constitutionality of independent agencies.57
Similarly, Jack Beermann argued, “the Court did not deliver on the opening
paragraph’s promise of a major reform in the law of separation of powers”
and that to the extent the decision was viewed as a milestone “it is more
likely to be understood as the acceptance of independent agencies by a
conservative Court that may have been expected to move things in a
different direction.” 58 As the next part explains, this Article challenges
these common perceptions.
II. A PROOF FOR THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PCAOB
Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion for the Court sets out a number of very
broad principles about separation of powers and the importance of vesting
the executive power in a single President. These principles cast doubt on
the constitutionality of agency independence more generally. The opinion

54. Stephen M. Bainbridge, The PCAOB Anti-climax, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (June
28, 2010, 9:38 AM) http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/
2010/06/the-pcaob-anticlimax.html.
55. Richard H. Pildes, Free Enterprise Fund, Boundary—Enforcing Decisions, and the
Unitary Executive Branch Theory of Government Administration, 6 DUKE J. CONST. L. &
PUB. POL’Y (forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1678031.
56. Peter L. Strauss, On the Difficulties of Generalization—PCAOB in the Footsteps of
Myers, Humphrey’s Executor, Morrison, and Freytag 17, 19 (Colum L. Sch. Pub. L. & Legal
Theory Working Paper Grp., Working Paper No. 10–253, 2010), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1693143.
57. Id. at 19.
58. Jack Michael Beermann, An Inductive Understanding of Separation of Powers or
Why the PCAOB Opinion Doesn’t Change Anything Yet 3–4 (Boston Univ. Sch. of L.,
Working Paper No. 10–24, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1656452.
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notes the “modesty” of the question proposed, 59 but then answers that
question with principles that form a proof, one that seems suited not so
much to the unusual facts of this case, but rather to independent agencies
more broadly. Moreover, the Court uses a severance remedy that can easily
be applied to independent agencies because it allows an agency to continue
with its duties, subject to the possibility of at will removal by the President.
In the course of answering the modest question about the Board, the
decision provides the reasoning for undermining Humphrey’s Executor and
the constitutionality of agency independence. Is the Court inclined to
overrule its precedents to invalidate agency independence? There are some
reasons to think that it has created an opening for such a challenge, as
discussed below. 60 Although there are the usual difficulties with predicting
where the Court will go next, the logic of Free Enterprise Fund has the
potential to disrupt agency independence across the board.
This part explains the Court’s proof in greater detail and demonstrates
how the opinion’s reasoning sets the foundation for challenging the
constitutionality of agency independence. Admittedly, the Chief Justice’s
opinion does not proceed precisely in the form identified in this part; such a
clear roadmap of the broader implications might run against claims to
judicial modesty. Yet the principles about the structure of the Constitution,
the vesting of the executive power in the President, the need for political
accountability in the executive branch, and the constitutional imperative of
the removal power form a type of proof that highlights the central logic of
the opinion, which is that a statute cannot diminish or eliminate the
President’s power to oversee and remove executive officers.
A. Faithful Execution of the Laws Requires Presidential Oversight
The Court’s major premise is that separation of powers requires the
President to oversee and to control executive branch officials in order to
ensure faithful execution of the laws.
In Free Enterprise Fund, the Court begins with separation of powers:
“Our Constitution divided the powers of the new Federal Government into
three defined categories, Legislative, Executive, and Judicial.”61 Article II
vests the executive power in the President who must take care that the laws
be faithfully executed.62 Executive officers help the President with his
duties and the Constitution empowers the President to “keep these officers
accountable—by removing them from office, if necessary.” 63 The President
must oversee executive officers, because “if any power whatsoever is in its

59. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3157
(2010) (“The point is not to take issue with for-cause limitations in general; we do not do
that. The question here is far more modest.”).
60. See infra Part IV.A.
61. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3146 (internal quotation marks omitted).
62. U.S. Const. art II, § 1, § 3; Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3146.
63. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3146.
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nature Executive, it is the power of appointing, overseeing, and controlling
those who execute the laws.” 64
To support this principle, the Chief Justice appeals to the “landmark
case” of Myers v. United States, 65 which recognized that the President has
“general administrative control of those executing the laws.”66 Myers is
often considered to be the high-water mark of the unitary executive theory,
because the lengthy decision emphasizes the constitutional imperative of
the President’s exclusive and unhampered removal power. Invoking Myers
at the outset indicates the direction of the Court’s opinion. The Court does
not frequently cite Myers, but follows its general principles throughout.
The Court links control of the executive branch with the ability to
oversee the work of its officers. “Without the ability to oversee the Board,
or to attribute the Board’s failings to those whom he can oversee, the
President is no longer the judge of the Board’s conduct.”67 The President
can judge the Board’s conduct only if he can oversee its activities. Here,
the Court expresses this idea in the context of the double layer of for-cause
removal, but the principle stresses the general importance of presidential
oversight of executive officers.
The Court explains that the President’s responsibility for overseeing and
controlling executive branch officials stems in part from the constitutional
obligation to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”68 The
President’s inability to oversee the Board means that “[h]e can neither
ensure that the laws are faithfully executed, nor be held responsible for a
Board member’s breach of faith.” 69 The judgment of what constitutes
“faithful execution” of the laws rests with the President under Article II.
Accordingly, the President must be able to set the standard for determining
whether his subordinates are properly executing their duties.70 If the
President is to be held accountable to the people for faithful execution, he
must be able to oversee the work of executive branch officials and such
oversight must be left to his discretion. 71
Moreover, the Court explains that presidential oversight and control of
executive branch officials has an important structural purpose—it plays an
integral part in the scheme of separation of powers between the President
and Congress. The President’s appointment, oversight, and control of those
who execute the laws are “key constitutional means” for the executive to
64. Id. at 3151 (1 ANNALS OF CONG. 463 (1789) (statement of James Madison)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
65. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
66. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3152 (quoting Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. at
164) (internal quotation marks omitted).
67. Id. at 3154.
68. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; see also Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3147 (“The
President cannot ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed’ if he cannot oversee the
faithfulness of the officers who execute them.”).
69. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3154.
70. As the next part of the proof explains, oversight of subordinates requires being able
to remove them at will. See infra Part II.B.
71. As the third step of the proof explains, this argument leads the Court to the principle
that the removal power cannot be limited by statute. See infra Part II.C.
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resist the encroachments of the other branches. 72 The Court considers the
appointment and oversight of executive officials to be one of the structural
protections of the Constitution that, in the words of James Madison, allows
ambition to counteract ambition by “giving each branch ‘the necessary
constitutional means, and personal motives, to resist encroachments of the
others.’” 73
Without presidential oversight, Congress could assume a
disproportionate power over the administrative state. As the Court
explains, “Congress has plenary control over the salary, duties, and even
existence of executive offices. Only presidential oversight can counter its
influence.” 74 Vesting responsibility for executive officers with the
President empowers him to resist legislative encroachments. In addition, it
matches responsibility for faithful execution with control over executive
branch officials. 75
For this responsibility to be efficacious, the responsibility must
ultimately belong to the President alone: “It is his responsibility to take
care that the laws be faithfully executed. The buck stops with the President,
in Harry Truman’s famous phrase.” 76 The Chief Justice does not use the
contentious term “unitary executive,” but instead cites an opinion by Justice
Stephen Breyer for the proposition that the President “‘cannot delegate
ultimate responsibility or the active obligation to supervise that goes with
it,’ because Article II ‘makes a single President responsible for the actions
of the Executive Branch.’” 77 The singular, centralized nature of the
President’s authority is a key feature of the structure of accountability
within the executive branch.
Chief Justice Roberts explains that the unitary nature of presidential
control is necessary to self-government:
Our Constitution was adopted to enable the people to govern
themselves, through their elected leaders. The growth of the Executive
Branch, which now wields vast power and touches almost every aspect of
72. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3157 (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 463 (1789))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
73. Id. at 3157 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison)).
74. Id. at 3156.
75. Similarly, in Myers the Court explained that the constitutional structure could not
have given Congress or the Senate
in case of political or other differences, the means of thwarting the Executive in
the exercise of his great powers and in the bearing of his great responsibility, by
fastening upon him, as subordinate executive officers, men who by their inefficient
service . . . [or] by their lack of loyalty to the service, or by their different views of
policy, might make his taking care that the laws be faithfully executed most
difficult or impossible.
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 131 (1926). Myers noted that the President’s exercise of
his great powers requires subordinates who are efficient, loyal, and share the President’s
view of policy. Id. The President’s responsibilities require that he oversee whether his
subordinates meet these and other criteria that he might set out for their service in his
Administration. Id.
76. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3152.
77. Id. at 3154 (emphasis added) (quoting Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 712–13
(1997) (Breyer, J., concurring)).

2011]

ABOLISHING AGENCY INDEPENDENCE

2553

daily life, heightens the concerns that it may slip from the Executive’s
control, and thus from that of the people. 78

It follows from the President’s constitutional responsibility that resting
important executive powers beyond the control of the President undermines
democratic accountability. “The diffusion of power carries with it a
diffusion of accountability.” 79 Within the executive branch, the President is
the only democratically elected official and the political accountability of
his subordinates depends on their accountability to the President.80 The
Court acknowledges that Congress has the power to create a vast federal
bureaucracy, but the “Constitution requires that a President chosen by the
entire Nation oversee the execution of the laws.” 81
The Court establishes this central principle: vested with the executive
power, the President must oversee executive officers as part of his
obligation for faithful execution of the laws and to ensure political
accountability for the work of the executive branch. This principle serves
as the major premise of the Court’s proof.
B. Presidential Oversight Requires the Capacity to Remove Subordinate
Officers
The Court begins with the premise that the structure of our constitutional
democracy requires that the President oversee the work of his subordinates
and ensure they are faithfully executing the laws. The first principle is
relatively uncontroversial, as the need for presidential supervision of the
executive branch is widely acknowledged. 82 The difficult questions pertain
to how the President exercises supervision and to what degree Congress can
restrict the President’s ability to supervise.
The Court answers some of these questions in its second premise:
presidential oversight requires the President have the ability to remove
executive branch officials. Effective oversight and control require the
ability to remove officials who fail to properly execute the laws. As Chief
Justice Roberts explains, debates during the founding era suggested that
“the executive power included a power to oversee executive officers
through removal; because that traditional executive power was not
‘expressly taken away, it remained with the President.’” 83 By contrast,
Justice Breyer does not argue against the importance of presidential

78. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3156.
79. Id. at 3155.
80. Id. (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 72 (Alexander Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed., 1961)).
81. Id. at 3155–56.
82. See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 56, at 20 (“[T]he question is not whether [the President]
is entitled to command or decide, but what constitutes the constitutionally indispensable
elements of his necessary oversight relationship.”).
83. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3151–52 (emphasis added) (quoting letter from
James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (June 30, 1789), in 16 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 893 (2004)).
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oversight, but instead maintains that such oversight may be provided by
means other than the removal power. 84
At various points in the opinion, the Court suggests that these two
principles—presidential oversight and the removal power—are inextricably
linked. This is the strongest form of the argument with regard to the unitary
executive and the unconstitutionality of the independent agencies, and is the
principle at the heart of Myers.85 The Court expounds on how the removal
power is one of the key constitutional means of presidential control over the
executive branch. The President cannot fulfill his responsibilities through
mere persuasion. As Chief Justice Roberts emphasizes, “Congress cannot
reduce the Chief Magistrate to a cajoler-in-chief.” 86
The accountability of the President for the faithful execution of the laws
requires that he have the power to secure execution in the manner he sees
fit: “That power includes, as a general matter, the authority to remove those
who assist him in carrying out his duties. Without such power, the
President could not be held fully accountable for discharging his own
responsibilities; the buck would stop somewhere else.” 87 This argument
proceeds on the structural understanding that oversight requires the means
of controlling subordinates and that ultimate control requires the removal
power. Without the ability to direct and control backed up by the removal
power, executive authority dissipates and this undermines the responsibility
of the President for the actions of the executive branch. The natural
implication of the constitutional structure is that the President retains the
full removal power, a point also discussed in Myers. 88
By contrast, the dissent defends the Act by highlighting the virtues of
bureaucratic independence. Statutes give the heads of independent agencies
tenure protection precisely to limit the President’s oversight and political
control. Justice Breyer expresses the standard interests served by for-cause
removal provisions, including that they protect the independence of
adjudication and serve the “need for technical expertise.” 89 With regard to
the independent agencies, such goals are thought to be in conflict with
direct presidential oversight. Independent agencies are created in part to
remove certain functions from the President’s “political” influence.
84. Id. at 3170 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (evaluating the extent to which the removal
provision “as a practical matter” limits the “President’s exercise of executive authority”).
85. See generally Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 122 (1926) (explaining in great
historical detail why the removal power necessarily follows from the President’s control of
the executive branch).
86. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3157.
87. Id. at 3164.
88. Myers drew this connection between faithful execution of the laws and the power to
appoint and remove executive officers. As Chief Justice William Howard Taft explained,
The power of removal is incident to the power of appointment, not to the power of
advising and consenting to appointment, and when the grant of the executive
power is enforced by the express mandate to take care that the laws be faithfully
executed, it emphasizes the necessity for including within the executive power as
conferred the exclusive power of removal.
Myers, 272 U.S. at 122.
89. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3174 (Breyer, J. dissenting).
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Justice Breyer would also uphold independence of the Board and its
double insulation from presidential removal on the ground that the statutory
oversight provided by the Commission is constitutionally sufficient. He
explains that although Board members may be removed only for cause, in
reality the statute gives the Commission very broad control over the Board
and such functional control renders the Board constitutional. The statutory
scheme includes various means of control, including that the Commission
(1) must approve Board rules, (2) may review and alter Board rules, (3)
may review and alter Board sanctions, and (4) may promulgate rules
restricting the Board’s conduct of inspections and investigations.90
Moreover, the Commission controls the Board’s budget and can assign the
Board any duties or functions that it deems appropriate. 91
Justice Breyer argues that these provisions effectively give the
Commission a significant degree of control over the Board even without atwill removal: “And if the President’s control over the Commission is
sufficient, and the Commission’s control over the Board is virtually
absolute, then, as a practical matter, the President’s control over the Board
should prove sufficient as well.” 92 From the dissent’s perspective, the
limitations on the Commissioners’ removal power have little significance
because of the Commissioners’ “authority and virtually comprehensive
control over all of the Board’s functions.” 93 In sum, functional control can
substitute for removal and provide a constitutionally sufficient method of
oversight.
Chief Justice Roberts responds to the dissent by defending the
importance of the removal power on both functional and constitutional
grounds. First, he argues that functional means of control cannot replace
the removal power. Although the Commission may hold the Board
accountable by approving its budget or overseeing its rules and sanctions,
these means of control are “not equivalent to the power to remove Board
members.” 94 As a practical matter, control over the Board’s budget or
sanctions “is a problematic way to control an inferior officer. The
Commission cannot wield a free hand to supervise individual members if it
must destroy the Board in order to fix it.” 95 The Court stresses that removal
is a targeted and specific method of oversight that allows the President to
dismiss an executive officer who fails to serve the goals and policies of the
President. Chief Justice Roberts argues that removal is a better and more
precise means of control. Other methods, such as cutting the Board’s
budget or enacting rules to govern the Board’s procedures, work like a
sledgehammer when a scalpel is more effective. The President should not
have to hobble a government agency because he cannot dismiss an
ineffective or disloyal officer.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 3172.
Id. at 3173 (citing statutory provisions).
Id.
Id. at 3172.
Id. at 3158 (majority opinion).
Id. at 3158–59.

2556

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

The Chief Justice’s argument, however, goes beyond a disagreement
about whether removal is functionally superior. Rather, removal is the
constitutionally required means of oversight, particularly because the Board
exercises significant executive power outside of the effective control of the
Commission. 96 The Court rejects the idea that pragmatic or functional
limitations can be, as Justice Breyer says, “sufficient,” because they do not
serve the same purpose as removal—a distinct means of oversight related to
the executive power and executive duty of faithful execution. Accordingly,
the constitutional structure of separation of powers requires presidential
oversight of executive officers and such oversight requires the ability to
remove these officers at will.
C. Congress Cannot Limit the President’s Removal Power
Faithful execution of the laws requires presidential oversight of executive
officials. Moreover, such oversight requires, as a general rule, the ability to
remove officials when they fail to perform to the President’s standards.
These first two fundamental principles lead to the next question about the
extent to which Congress has the authority to restrict the President’s
removal authority. This is precisely the question at issue in the case:
“whether Congress may deprive the President of adequate control over the
Board, which is the regulator of first resort and the primary law
enforcement authority for a vital sector of our economy.” 97 The Court
holds that Congress cannot deprive the President of such “adequate
control.” 98
This question, however, is not entirely straightforward. The Constitution
provides for the appointment of principal and inferior officers, but is silent
with respect to their removal.99 Since Humphrey’s Executor, the Court has
held that Congress may limit the President’s authority to remove officials
within independent agencies. 100 Moreover, the Court has also upheld
restrictions on principal officers to remove their inferiors, because the
principal officers remain ultimately responsible to the President.101 The
Court puts aside consideration of these cases and notes that their validity is
not at issue in this case. 102 The specific question about the constitutionality
of two levels of for-cause removal is one of first impression. With regard to

96. Id. at 3159 (“[T]he Act nowhere gives the Commission effective power to start, stop,
or alter individual Board investigations, executive activities typically carried out by officials
within the Executive Branch.”).
97. Id. at 3161.
98. Id.
99. See id. at 3167 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[T]he question presented lies at the
intersection of two sets of conflicting, broadly framed constitutional principles. And no text,
no history, perhaps no precedent provides any clear answer.”); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S.
654, 697 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
100. See Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 631–32 (1935).
101. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 672; United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483, 485 (1886).
102. The parties stipulated that SEC members could be removed only for cause, and they
did not challenge the validity of Humphrey’s Executor. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3148.
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this new arrangement, the Court holds that the removal power can be
diluted no further. Two levels is too many.
Nonetheless, in reaching this conclusion about the Board, the Chief
Justice sets out the general principle that Congress cannot limit the
President’s removal power, because such power is constitutionally vested in
the President. “Congress has plenary control over the salary, duties, and
even existence of executive offices. Only Presidential oversight can
counter its influence. That is why the Constitution vests certain powers in
the President that ‘the Legislature has no right to diminish or modify.’”103
Presidential oversight is an essential counterbalance to Congress and the
removal power is essential to make such oversight effective.104 The vesting
of the executive power with the President means that Congress cannot
“diminish or modify” the President’s powers, including the power to
remove executive officers. Although the Court at points pleads restraint, its
language goes beyond the narrow question of the Board’s unusual two
layers of insulation from presidential control, and instead sets forth the
constitutional principle that Congress cannot diminish or modify the
President’s removal power because of the constitutional structure of
separation of powers and the vesting of the executive power in the
President.
The generality of the Court’s principle—that the President must retain
the full removal power—is reflected in the statements quoted above, but
also in the opinion’s fourth footnote, which provides a key step in the
Court’s reasoning. 105 The Court explains that the double layer of for-cause
protection is problematic when the President wants to remove a Board
member whom the Commission wants to retain. “With the second layer in
place, the Commission can shield its decision from Presidential review by
finding that good cause is absent—a finding that, given the Commission’s
own protected tenure, the President cannot easily overturn.” 106 Chief
Justice Roberts argues that this is not just a possible scenario. Rather, “it is
the central issue in this case: The second layer matters precisely when the
President finds it necessary to have a subordinate officer removed, and a
statute prevents him from doing so.” 107
The Court concludes that a statute cannot prevent the President from
removing a subordinate officer when he finds it necessary, because the
President must have sole authority to determine necessity for removal. The
removal power is a constitutional one and cannot be hampered by for-cause
103. Id. at 3156 (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. at 463 (1789) (statement of James
Madison)).
104. Id. at 3157.
105. Id. at 3154 n.4. Cf. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4
(1938); J.M. Balkin, The Footnote, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 275, 281 (1989) (“When
constitutional scholars talk about the ‘problem of the footnote,’ they are referring to a
specific footnote, the Footnote, footnote four of United States v. Carolene Products . . . .
Here indeed is a footnote that has become more important than the text; that is often read
separated from its text; that can stand alone.”).
106. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3154 n.4.
107. Id.
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limitations. The Court applies this principle to the double layer at issue in
this case, but the Court’s reasoning is not limited to the double layer.
The Court’s remedy—severing the Board’s for-cause removal
protections—reinforces the constitutional mandate of the removal power.
The Court explains that for-cause removal in the Act is only one of a
number of provisions that together create the constitutional violation, and
Congress remains free to pursue other alterations to the statute. But the
Court suggests that any such alteration must allow the President to oversee
and to control officials conducting core executive functions. Congress
could “limit the Board’s responsibilities so that its members would no
longer be ‘Officers of the United States,’” or the Board’s enforcement
powers might be limited so it becomes purely recommendatory. 108 The
alternatives suggested by the Court, however, make clear that Congress
cannot create independence from presidential oversight, control, and
removal for a Board that executes core executive branch functions. This
remains true even if Congress does not aggregate power to itself and even if
the President wishes to tie his hands with such provisions.
Thus, the Court maintains that the President’s power to remove
subordinate officers at will is a constitutional one that cannot be diminished
or modified by statute.
D. QED: Tenure Protections for the Board are Unconstitutional
The Court sets out three broad principles: (1) faithful execution of the
laws requires presidential oversight, (2) this oversight includes the power to
remove executive branch officials, and (3) the removal power is a
constitutional one that cannot be diminished or eliminated by statute. The
Court draws from these broad principles the narrow conclusion that the
Board’s two layers of for-cause tenure are unconstitutional. This “new type
of restriction—two levels of protection from removal for those who
nonetheless exercise significant executive power” does not follow from the
Court’s precedents.109 The Court explains: “We deal with the unusual
situation, never before addressed by the Court, of two layers of for-cause
tenure. And though it may be criticized as ‘elementary arithmetical logic,’
two layers are not the same as one.” 110 The Court concludes, “Congress
cannot limit the President’s authority in this way.” 111
The Court emphasizes the novel, second level of tenure protection as its
reason for holding the Board’s independence unconstitutional. The Court
holds that Board officials exercising executive power must have
presidential oversight because such oversight ensures faithful execution and
allows the public to hold the President politically responsible for the actions
of the executive branch: “By granting the Board executive power without
the Executive’s oversight, this Act subverts the President’s ability to ensure
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at 3162.
Id. at 3164.
Id. at 3157 (citation omitted).
Id. at 3164.
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that the laws are faithfully executed—as well as the public’s ability to pass
judgment on his efforts.” 112 Article II vests the executive power in the
President and the Court stresses that the President is singularly responsible
for the actions of the executive branch. Accordingly, he cannot delegate
this ultimate responsibility or the obligation to supervise that goes with
it. 113 The Court makes clear that the Constitution requires presidential
oversight and that such oversight requires unimpaired removal power by the
President. The for-cause protections for the Board are unconstitutional
because they disrupt the chain of accountability between the President and
executive branch officials beyond the Court’s existing precedents.
After the lofty discussion about the importance of presidential oversight
of executive officials, however, the Court provides a more pedestrian
remedy to the constitutional problem. Severing the for-cause tenure
protection simply allows the Commission to remove Board members at
will—it does not bring Board members under the direct oversight of the
President. The Board remains insulated from presidential control by the
for-cause limits protecting the Commissioners. The Commissioners can
remove Board members at will, but because of the Commissioners’
protected tenure, the President’s control over the Board continues to be
attenuated.114
The Court’s proof establishes both more and less than what it needs to
justify its remedy. It establishes too much with the first three steps of the
proof that would naturally lead to the conclusion that the Board requires
direct presidential oversight. It establishes too little when it fails to explain
why oversight by the SEC, an independent agency, is a constitutionally
sufficient means for the President to exercise control of the Board. As the
next part demonstrates, however, a proof ill-suited to the Board nonetheless
applies logically and perhaps more naturally to the traditional independent
agencies.
III. CHALLENGING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF FIRST-LEVEL AGENCY
INDEPENDENCE
Despite claims to minimalism by the Court, Free Enterprise Fund
logically implicates the constitutionality of agency independence. The
breadth of the proof and the narrowness of the remedy are not well suited to
the unusual and limited question about the constitutionality of the Board’s
two levels of tenure protection. The proof and the remedy, however, create
a framework for challenging the constitutionality of the independent
agencies more generally. By emphasizing the importance of presidential
control and accountability through the removal power, the Court calls into
question the constitutionality of the ordinary first layer of agency
independence. Moreover, severing for-cause removal provisions provides a
112. Id. at 3155.
113. Id. at 3154.
114. Justice Breyer identifies this central aspect of the majority’s opinion. Id. at 3171
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
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workable remedy for eliminating agency independence without eliminating
the independent agencies.
Admittedly, Free Enterprise Fund does not directly challenge the
constitutionality of the SEC or other independent agencies, because these
questions were not presented to the Court. The parties stipulated that
Commissioners could be removed only under the Humphrey’s Executor
standard of “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.”115
Moreover, no party challenged the constitutionality of the SEC’s
independence or asked the Court to reexamine Humphrey’s Executor. 116
Accordingly, the Court does not revisit its precedents, nor does it
The Court, however, suggests some
specifically reaffirm them. 117
receptivity to a future challenge when it emphasizes that the President’s
removal power follows from the constitutional structure, whereas
limitations on the removal power rest only on the Court’s precedents.118
Furthermore, the logic of the Chief Justice’s opinion calls into question the
constitutionality of one layer of removal protections. As this part
demonstrates, the Court’s framework could be used to challenge agency
independence and possibly revisit Humphrey’s Executor.
A. Applying the Proof to One Level of Agency Independence
The principles and proof that lead the Court to conclude that the Board’s
two layers of tenure protections are unconstitutional logically apply to most
for-cause restrictions on the President’s removal power, such as those
insulating the independent agencies from presidential oversight. This
logical application, of course, runs headlong into the Court’s precedents.
Whether the Court would in fact reconsider its precedents remains to be
seen, but Free Enterprise Fund holds out this possibility. 119
The Court’s first premise is that faithful execution of the laws requires
presidential oversight. This general principle follows from the separation of
powers, the vesting of executive power in the President, and the need for
democratic accountability in the executive branch. Although the Court at
times focuses on the Board’s two layers of for-cause removal, it also casts
doubt on whether one layer is constitutional. For example, the Chief Justice
repeatedly highlights that the President can hold the Commissioners
accountable only in an attenuated way because they can be removed only
for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office: “Neither the
President, nor anyone directly responsible to him, nor even an officer whose
115. Id. at 3148 (majority opinion) (quoting Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295
U.S. 602, 620 (1935)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
116. Id. at 3147.
117. Cf. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding that the Gun Free School
Zone Act of 1990 exceeds Congress’s Commerce Clause authority, but reaffirming farreaching Commerce Clause precedents such as Wickard v. Filburn).
118. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3146 (“Since 1789, the Constitution has been
understood to empower the President to keep [executive] officers accountable—by removing
them from office, if necessary. This Court has determined, however, that this authority is
not without limit.”) (emphasis added) (citing Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926)).
119. See infra Part IV.A.
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conduct he may review only for good cause, has full control over the
Board.” 120 The Chief Justice emphasizes the language of fullness—
somebody must be “fully accountable” for the Board’s conduct, must have
“full control over the Board.” 121
Moreover, contrary to the reading of other commentators, 122 the Court’s
holding does not require reaffirming the constitutionality of the first layer.
In fact, throughout the opinion the Court casts doubt on the constitutionality
of the limited control that the President has over the Commission. For
example, after emphasizing the importance of full or direct control over
executive officers, the Court notes that the President lacks “direct control”
of the Commission. 123 The Court treats full control as the constitutional
standard, but stresses that the President has less than full control of the
Commission. Under existing precedents and the parties’ stipulation as to
the independence of the Commission, the President can hold the
Commission accountable only up to a point.
The Court never states that the President’s control over the Commission
is sufficient, only that it remains unchallenged in this case. Instead, the
Court simply repeats that without the tenure protections on the Board the
President “could then hold the Commission to account for its supervision of
the Board, to the same extent that he may hold the Commission to account
for everything else it does.” 124 The second level of tenure protection
changes even this limited accountability because the President “cannot hold
the Commission fully accountable for the Board’s conduct, to the same
extent that he may hold the Commission accountable for everything else
that it does.” 125
This formulation is at best ambiguous about the constitutionality of the
SEC’s single layer of independence from the President’s control. Far from
accepting the constitutionality of the first layer, it notes that accountability
of the President over the Commission is incomplete—not full control or
supervision, but some ill-defined quantum of accountability for all of the
Commission’s actions. The Court does not have to reaffirm the
constitutionality of the Commission’s for-cause removal protection to reach
its conclusion. It simply holds that having a second layer of for-cause
protection fundamentally changes the nature of the President’s removal
power and goes beyond the accountability preserved by the Court’s
precedents. What this accountability comes to, or whether and in what
circumstances it would be constitutional, is simply not addressed by the
decision. The logic of the opinion, however, strongly suggests that control
over independent agencies such as the SEC is not sufficient, precisely
120. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3154 (emphasis added).
121. Id.
122. See supra notes 56–58 and accompanying text.
123. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3153 (“[The] decision [regarding the Board’s
removal] is vested instead in other tenured officers—the Commissioners—none of whom is
subject to the President’s direct control.”).
124. Id. at 3154.
125. Id.
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because separation of powers requires the President to have full oversight
and control over executive branch officials.
The lack of adequate control relates to the second premise: presidential
oversight requires the removal power. Again, the constitutional importance
of the removal power does not turn on the two layers of removal protection
for the PCAOB. Rather, the Court states a general principle that can extend
to the first level of agency independence: “The Constitution that makes the
President accountable to the people for executing the laws also gives him
the power to do so. That power includes, as a general matter, the authority
to remove those who assist him in carrying out his duties.” 126 If oversight
requires control through the ability to remove, this logically applies to the
first layer of tenure protection as well.
The implication for the first level is reflected in the Court’s analysis of
the lack of “full” accountability over the Board, which does not result only
from the second level of tenure protection as the Court sometimes
maintains. Rather, the constitutional infirmity arises from the combination
of tenure protections—the President can remove Commissioners only for
cause, and the Commissioners in turn can remove Board members only for
cause. The second level of tenure protections for the Board would not be
unconstitutional but for the fact of the SEC’s independence.
If
Commissioners could be removed at will, then the tenure protections for
Board members would presumably be constitutional under Morrison v.
Olson. 127 The SEC’s independence is thus essential to the Court’s
conclusion. If the Commissioners’ independence—their insulation from
removal except for specified causes—poses no constitutional difficulty,
then why can the Board not be independent from the SEC? The narrow and
direct answer is that two layers of tenure protection are not the same as
one. 128
The Court’s logic, however, suggests a more substantial constitutional
infirmity. The unconstitutionality of the Board’s tenure protection stems
from the independence of the SEC. The Court holds that the second layer
diminishes presidential control to an unacceptable degree: “this dispersion
of responsibility could be multiplied. If Congress can shelter the
bureaucracy behind two layers of good-cause tenure, why not a third?”129
The Court holds that two or more layers of for-cause tenure impermissibly
limit the President’s authority. The constitutionality of one layer of forcause protection looms large despite the Court’s protestations to the
contrary. If Congress cannot shelter the bureaucracy behind two layers of
good-cause tenure, why can it shelter the bureaucracy behind one? The

126. Id. at 3164.
127. 487 U.S. 654, 692 (1988) (upholding for-cause restrictions on the Attorney
General’s ability to remove the independent counsel because “the Executive, through the
Attorney General, retains ample authority to assure that the counsel is competently
performing his or her statutory responsibilities in a manner that comports with the provisions
of the Act”).
128. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3154–55.
129. Id. at 3154.
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Court’s reasoning implies that the first level of independence is at least
constitutionally attenuated. Holding that the Board’s protections go too far
in removing control from the President implies that the independence of the
Commission is itself on shaky constitutional ground because it undermines
full presidential oversight. Whether one layer of agency independence
impermissibly diminishes the President’s control is a question left for
another case, but the Court lays the foundations for an affirmative answer.
This implication is not lost on the dissenters. Justice Breyer denounces
the Chief Justice’s logical assault on the independent agencies. “[I]f the
President’s control over the Commission is sufficient, and the
Commission’s control over the Board is virtually absolute, then, as a
practical matter, the President’s control over the Board should prove
Justice Breyer’s argument draws on two
sufficient as well.” 130
assumptions. First, the President’s control over the SEC is sufficient; and
second, the SEC’s control over the Board is virtually absolute. The
majority focuses its argument on the second assumption and stresses that
the Commission’s control over the Board is not absolute, but instead leaves
the Board with substantial independence over important executive
functions. The majority explains at length how the Commissioners are “not
responsible for the Board’s actions” 131 and focuses on the specific
deficiencies of the statutory scheme creating the Board.
The logic of the Court’s opinion, however, repeatedly throws Justice
Breyer’s other fundamental premise into question—i.e., that presidential
control over the SEC is constitutionally sufficient. The second step of the
Court’s proof—that presidential oversight requires the unhampered removal
power—can apply to the first layer of for-cause removal as well as to the
second. The Court indicates that the President’s control over the
Commission is not sufficient because the President cannot oversee
Commissioners or remove them at will. For example, Chief Justice Roberts
explains, “Without the ability to oversee the Board, or to attribute the
Board’s failings to those whom he can oversee, the President is no longer
the judge of the Board’s conduct.” 132 The Court finds that the President
cannot oversee the Board, in part because the President cannot sufficiently
oversee the Commission. The President cannot adequately oversee the
Commission precisely because he cannot remove Commissioners at will.133
Which brings us to the third step of the proof: Congress cannot diminish
or modify the President’s removal power. As with the previous steps, the
130. Id. at 3173 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 3154 (majority opinion); see also id. at 3158–59 (describing the statutory
scheme and explaining the absence of meaningful control by the Commissioners).
132. Id. at 3154.
133. Justice Breyer again does not let the Court sidestep the central inquiry. The majority
identifies as the central problem the fact that the decision to remove Board members is
vested in Commissioners, “none of whom is subject to the President’s direct control.” Id. at
3171 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Breyer explains that “nullifying the Commission’s power to
remove Board members only for cause will not resolve the problem the Court has identified:
The President will still be ‘powerless to intervene’ by removing the Board members if the
Commission reasonably decides not to do so.” Id.
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general principle follows from separation of powers and the vesting of the
executive power in the President. The Chief Justice’s explanation for why
Congress cannot place a double restriction on the President’s removal
power also implies that a single restriction is unconstitutional. As footnote
four explains, the central issue in the case is that “[t]he second layer matters
precisely when the President finds it necessary to have a subordinate officer
removed, and a statute prevents him from doing so.” 134 Of course, this is
also the central issue with regard to the constitutionality of the first layer of
removal protection enjoyed by the heads of the independent agencies. The
for-cause removal limits matter “precisely when the President finds it
necessary to have a subordinate officer removed, and a statute prevents him
from doing so.” 135 This issue is the nub of the constitutional question for
the first layer of removal protections as much as for the second. The Chief
Justice’s logic fails, perhaps by design, to distinguish between the
constitutionality of one and two layers of for-cause removal protection.
Justice Breyer makes the same observation: “the Court fails to show why
two layers of ‘for cause’ protection—Layer One insulating the
Commissioners from the President, and Layer Two insulating the Board
from the Commissioners—impose any more serious limitation upon the
President’s powers than one layer.” 136 Layer One insulates the Board from
the President’s full control in the same manner that it insulates all of the
activities of the Commission. The Court’s severance remedy gives the
President only slightly more control over the Board by removing the second
layer of protection. The primary control over the Board goes to the
Commissioners, who remain subject to removal by the President only for
cause. The President’s indirect control over the Board is enhanced by the
decision in uncertain ways. 137 The President can hold Commissioners
responsible only if their failure to remove a Board member results from
inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.
If a Board member disregards presidential policy and the Commissioners
decide not to remove the Board member, this would likely not constitute
“good cause” for removal. 138 Thus, as the dissent recognizes “a removal
restriction’s effect upon presidential power depends not on the presence of a
‘double-layer’ of for-cause removal, as the majority pretends, but rather on
the real-world nature of the President’s relationship with the
Commission.” 139 This real-world relationship includes the fact that the
134. Id. at 3154 n.4 (majority opinion).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 3171 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 3170–71 (explaining how the decision may increase or decrease the President’s
control depending on the circumstances).
138. This raises the question of what “good cause” might require. The Court states that
neither its precedents nor the Government suggested that disagreement with policies or
priorities would be good cause for removal. See id. at 3157 (majority opinion). For a helpful
discussion of reading “good cause” in light of constitutional concerns, see John F. Manning,
The Independent Counsel Statute: Reading “Good Cause” in Light of Article II, 83 MINN.
L. REV. 1285 (1999).
139. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3171 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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President cannot remove Commissioners except for cause, and therefore
cannot adequately oversee their work. The Court draws a line at the second
layer, but the decision rests on broad principles that do not distinguish
between layer one and layer two—the analysis suggests both are
unconstitutional.
Moreover, the Court’s proof implicates the independent agencies by
analogy: the President’s relationship to the SEC is as the SEC’s
relationship is to the Board. This analogy could lead to the conclusion that
the President’s control over the Commission is not sufficient for precisely
the same reason that the Commissioners’ control over the Board is not
sufficient: “The Commissioners are not responsible for the Board’s actions.
They are only responsible for their own determination of whether the Act’s
rigorous good-cause standard is met.” 140 Similarly, the President is not
responsible for the Commissioners’ actions. He is only responsible for
determining whether the good-cause standards are met. By analogy, such
limited responsibility does not satisfy the Constitution’s requirements
because, as the Court repeatedly emphasizes, the President must be fully
responsible for the work of executive officers as part of his duty to take care
that the laws be faithfully executed. The logical implication of the Court’s
proof is that statutory restrictions of even one layer on the President’s
removal power are unconstitutional.
B. A Workable Remedy: Separating Independence from the Independent
Agencies
The Court’s opinion presents a robust understanding of the constitutional
grounds for full presidential control of executive branch officials based on
separation of powers and the vesting of executive power in the President.
Severance highlights the importance of these principles. The Court’s
remedy can be seen as a masterful choice: minimal in this particular
decision, leaving the Board and its functions intact, while establishing a
plausible remedy for future judicial dismantling of agency independence.
The Court’s severance remedy provides a means of targeting agency
independence—not just the second layer, but also the first—without taking
the more radical step of abolishing the independent agencies. This
mitigates one of the main concerns expressed with overturning Humphrey’s
Executor, which is that the Court will not and cannot dismantle the
independent agencies because they are an entrenched part of the federal
government. The Court’s remedy is based on the idea that “the existence of
the Board does not violate the separation of powers, but the substantive
removal restrictions imposed by [the statute] do.” 141 This simple move,
separating the independence from the independent agency, provides a
model for future cases. The Court adopts a remedy that can bring

140. Id. at 3154 (majority opinion).
141. Id. at 3161.
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independent agencies fully under the President’s supervision, while
allowing those agencies to otherwise continue with their statutory duties. 142
In light of the historical growth and entrenchment of the independent
agencies, the Court’s remedy of separating the independence from the
independent agency fits the judicial role. The Court has determined that the
Constitution requires presidential oversight and accountability through the
removal power. The remedy has a minimalist result by which the Court
severs the portion of the Act that most offends the constitutionality of the
Board—the double for-cause removal protections. 143 The Board, however,
may continue with its statutory duties, only now subject to at-will removal
by the Commission. As the Court explains, severing the for-cause removal
protection for the Board, “affects the conditions under which those officers
might some day be removed, and would have no effect, absent a
congressional determination to the contrary, on the validity of any officer’s
continuance in office.” 144
Severance provides a remedy with much further potential to reach new
contexts, precisely because it minimizes disruption to the affected agencies.
Yet commentators have identified only the narrowness in this particular
case, focusing on how the Court leaves in place the first layer of
independence, the removal provisions protecting the SEC. For example,
Peter Strauss suggested that the Court affirmatively endorsed the
constitutionality of agency independence because “[t]he constitutionality of
the PCAOB’s authority could not . . . have been sustained without
accepting the single level of ‘for cause’ protection the majority attributed to
the SEC.” 145 Similarly, Jack Beermann argued, “By embracing ‘single’ for
cause restrictions on the discharge of most executive officials including the
heads of independent agencies, the Roberts Court has in essence approved
the independence of independent agencies.”146 They argue that logically
the Court must have endorsed the constitutionality of the first layer of
agency independence. This is one way to understand the Court’s opinion.
As discussed above, however, the Court does not have to accept or even
uphold the Commission’s independence to reach its conclusions. The Court
explicitly notes that the parties did not request the Court to reexamine its
earlier removal power precedents and that the Court does not do so in this

142. Id. (“Concluding that the removal restrictions are invalid leaves the Board removable
by the Commission at will, and leaves the President separated from Board members by only
a single level of good-cause tenure. The Commission is then fully responsible for the
Board’s actions, which are no less subject than the Commission’s own functions to
Presidential oversight.”).
143. Id. (explaining that severance allows the Court to “limit the solution to the
problem”). See Miller, supra note 18, at 44–45 (arguing that “Congress may not
constitutionally restrict the President’s power to remove officials who fail to obey . . .
presidential instructions” but explaining that this principle could be implemented through
interpretation and severance of offending provisions without “wholesale invalidation of
federal statutes”).
144. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3161.
145. Strauss, supra note 56, at 19.
146. Beermann, supra note 58, at 4.
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case. 147 The parties stipulated to the SEC’s removal protections and no
party asked the Court to reconsider the constitutionality of this
independence. The remedy thus proceeds from this stipulation, rather than
from a necessary holding about the constitutionality of the first layer.
Admittedly, severance leaves the relationship between the President and
Commission intact and petitioners’ proposed remedy—an injunction against
the continuing operations of the Board—would have been more
consequential in this case. Yet severance has more potential for future
challenges and it follows from constitutional principles far more ambitious
than the arguments raised for invalidating the Board.
The importance of the severance remedy and its potential may be
assessed by comparing it with the remedies proposed by petitioners.
Petitioners’ remedies and reasoning were largely limited to the Board and
other similar entities and so would not have created a framework for a
broader assault on agency independence. By contrast, the Court’s
severance remedy logically applies to independence more generally. The
Chief Justice’s opinion does not follow petitioners’ arguments. Instead, it
strikes out a different course, emphasizing that the vesting of the executive
power in the President and his obligation to take care that the laws be
faithfully executed require him to oversee and be able to remove executive
branch officials.
Contrary to what has been assumed by most commentators, the Court’s
rejection of petitioners’ Appointment Clause arguments and related
remedies establishes a firmer foundation for the President’s authority over
executive branch officials and casts a shadow over agency independence
generally. For example, petitioners argued that Board members are
principal officers requiring presidential appointment with the Senate’s
advice and consent under the Appointments Clause. If the Court had held
that Board members were principal officers under the Appointments
Clause, the holding would likely be limited to the unusual two-level tenure
protection of the Board.
Dissenting in the D.C. Circuit, Judge Kavanaugh would have decided the
case in part on these grounds. Notably, he emphasized the narrowness of
such reasoning, which “would not itself call into question the many other
independent agencies that dot Washington, D.C.” because the “heads of
those agencies are appointed by and removable for cause by the
President.” 148 By contrast, “the PCAOB is uniquely structured, and a
judicial holding invalidating it would be uniquely limited to the
PCAOB.” 149 Judge Kavanaugh correctly observed that judicial invalidation
of the PCAOB on these grounds would have little application to other
independent agencies.

147. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3147.
148. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667, 688 (D.C.
Cir. 2008) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
149. Id.
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An Appointments Clause challenge to the PCAOB cannot be easily
analogized to the independent agencies, whose heads are already treated as
principal officers with presidential selection and senate confirmation. There
may have been persuasive constitutional reasons for holding that Board
members are principal officers,150 but a holding on these grounds would not
advance the case against ordinary first-level agency independence.
Moreover, in previous decisions analyzing whether an executive officer is a
principal or inferior officer, the Court has stuck closely to the specific
functions of that officer and his relationship to other authorities.151 In this
case, the analysis would have had to focus on the Act, the type of functions
undertaken by Board members, and the extent of supervision exercised by
the Commission. Thus, a decision on these grounds might invalidate the
Board, but would have limited implications for other agencies.
In the alternative, petitioners argued that even if Board members were
“inferior officers,” the SEC is not a Department for Appointment Clause
purposes because its commissioners are not directly accountable to the
President. 152 The petitioners argued that only an entity with direct
accountability to the President could be considered a Department with the
constitutional authority to appoint inferior officers. If the Court had held
that an independent agency such as the SEC was not a Department, this
would prevent such agencies from making appointments of inferior officers.
This would deprive the heads of independent agencies of a substantial
power and might bring the appointment of these inferior officers within the
control of the President. It would not, however, provide the President any
greater control over the heads of the independent agencies. If the SEC were
not a “Department,” presumably Commissioners would remain subject to
removal only for good cause, and the President’s influence over the
commissioners would remain attenuated. The President might be able to
appoint inferior officers within the SEC, but without any additional control
over their superiors. 153 Again, a holding on these grounds might have been
150. See generally Gary Lawson, The “Principal” Reason Why the PCAOB is
L.
REV.
EN
BANC
73
(2009),
Unconstitutional,
62
VAND.
http://www.vanderbiltlawreview.org/articles/2009/11/Lawson-62-Vand-L-Rev-En-Banc73.pdf.
151. See, e.g., Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 664 (1997) (discussing the specific
duties of the Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals judges and their supervision by and
accountability to other executive officers before concluding that the judges are “inferior
officers”); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 671 (1988) (citing a number of factors for
determining whether an officer is an inferior one but noting that “[t]he line between
‘inferior’ and ‘principal’ officers is one that is far from clear, and the Framers provided little
guidance into where it should be drawn”).
152. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 33, at *56.
153. Petitioners also argued that even if the SEC were considered a Department, the full
Commission cannot appoint Board members because only the Chairman is the “Head.” Id. at
*60. They explained that “‘Heads of Departments’ does not connote a committee of equals”
because a “Head” was understood at the time of the founding to be a principal or leader and
the “Head” of the SEC is its Chairman. Id. Accordingly, the statutory provision that vests
appointment of the Board with the Commission is unconstitutional. See id. Such a holding
would be of limited long-term consequence largely for the same reasons as discussed with
regard to petitioners’ other claims.
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fatal for the Board, but would have few, if any, implications for agency
independence generally.
No doubt a decision on any of these alternative grounds would have
generated more headlines in this case because the likely remedy would be to
enjoin the Board’s operations, leaving uncertainty with the accounting
industry until Congress could respond to the Court’s decision. A holding
based on petitioners’ Appointment Clause arguments would have the
disadvantage of being perceived as activist in an area of significant political
interest—the regulation of the accounting industry after a number of highprofile difficulties and scandals. Moreover, the reasoning would be limited
to the Board and other similar entities with two layers of tenure protection.
To the extent that the Court wanted to assert a broader principle about
presidential control of the administrative state, these approaches would have
little impact in future cases.
Instead the Court rejects the Appointments Clause arguments and severs
the Act’s removal provisions, which leaves the Board in place, but subject
to full supervision by the Commission. This may have a modest or perhaps
even negligible impact on the Board, but follows from a series of
constitutional principles that provide a framework for challenging agency
independence more generally in a future case.
It does not require much imagination to see how this remedy could easily
apply to other independent agencies, precisely because it does not
jeopardize the existence of these agencies, only their independence. The
idea of severing the Board’s tenure protections precisely targets the aspect
of independent agencies thought to be unconstitutional—i.e., their
independence. The Court’s reasoning in Free Enterprise Fund suggests
that independence from presidential control undermines the constitutional
structure of separation of powers. The Court’s proposed remedy aims at the
constitutional violation. Severance could provide a remedy that allows the
independent agencies to continue with their statutory duties, but subject to
at-will removal by the President and therefore under his full control and
supervision.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE CASES
This part considers some of the implications of applying the reasoning of
Free Enterprise Fund to one layer of agency independence. First, I
highlight some indications that the Court may pursue its logic and
reexamine precedents such as Humphrey’s Executor. Second, I briefly
discuss some issues that may develop in future cases challenging the
constitutionality of agency independence.
A.

Minimalism or Marbury for the Independent Agencies?

This Article suggests that Free Enterprise Fund establishes a framework
for invalidating agency independence. This raises an obvious question
about whether the Court will reexamine Humphrey’s Executor and other
removal power precedents in a future case. Many commentators have
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suggested just the opposite—that Free Enterprise Fund in fact reaffirms the
constitutionality of the independent agencies. 154 The Court, however,
explicitly states that no party has asked for such a reexamination and the
Court does not reexamine those precedents in this case. But is the Court
open to this possibility in the future? Without hazarding a prediction of
what the Court will do, I want to suggest that the opinion in Free Enterprise
Fund demonstrates the Court’s openness to the possibility of invalidating
even one layer of agency independence. Whether such indications are
deliberate, the opinion holds more possibilities than has generally been
recognized.
First, the opinion opens by observing: “Since 1789, the Constitution has
been understood to empower the President to keep these [executive] officers
accountable—by removing them from office, if necessary. This Court has
determined, however, that this authority is not without limit.”155 The Court
proceeds to discuss Humphrey’s Executor and other limits on the removal
power upheld by the Court’s precedents.156 This leaves a potential space
between the constitutional authority of the President’s removal power and
the Court’s allowance of certain limitations in Humphrey’s Executor and
subsequent decisions. The Court’s precedents are not equivalent to the
Constitution as understood since 1789. At the outset, the Court stresses the
constitutional importance of the removal power and suggests receptivity to
a future challenge to agency independence and the Court’s limits on the
removal power.
Second, as discussed above, the logic of the opinion fits neatly with a
challenge to ordinary, one layer agency independence. It does not,
however, fit very closely with the facts of the Board. The opinion stresses
the importance of presidential oversight and control of executive officials,
but then allows the SEC, an independent agency, to have full removal
power over the Board. The Court highlights these principles in general
terms that apply directly to independent agencies separated from the
President’s removal power by one layer of for-cause protection. The fourth
footnote of the opinion makes clear that a statute cannot restrict the
President from removing a subordinate officer when he finds it necessary.
This approach foreshadows a challenge to agency independence generally
by adopting an expansive view of presidential authority and by stressing the
importance of the removal power to separation of powers.
Third, the Court also notes at the beginning of the opinion that existing
precedents are not at issue here. After briefly noting the Court’s key
decisions about removal, the Court states, “The parties do not ask us to
reexamine any of these precedents, and we do not do so.” 157 The Court
notably does not reaffirm these precedents and it never states that
presidential control over the SEC is constitutionally sufficient. It is only
154. See supra notes 52–55.
155. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3146
(2010) (emphasis added) (citing Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926)).
156. Id.
157. Id. at 3147.
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when the time comes for the remedy that the Court severs the removal
restrictions and leaves the Commission with the removal power for the
simple reason that “[u]nder the traditional default rule, removal is incident
to the power of appointment.” 158 In a future case, perhaps the Court will
measure Humphrey’s Executor and other precedents against the
constitutional requirements set forth in Free Enterprise Fund.
Fourth, the Court allows the parties to stipulate to the legal status of the
Commission as an independent agency. This stipulation allows the Court to
structure its argument in a manner that has broader potential reach. The
Court accepts the parties’ stipulation, even though, as Justice Breyer points
out, accepting this point of law creates the double layer and the
constitutional problem in this case. 159 The stipulation also allows for the
analogy to the first layer of agency independence. The Court holds that for
the Commission to exercise effective oversight and control over the Board,
the Commission must have the ability to remove Board members at will.
Similarly, for the President to exercise effective oversight and control over
an independent agency, the President must have the ability to remove the
heads of such agencies at will. The stipulation allows the Court to focus on
the constitutional imperative of presidential oversight and creates an
analogy to the first layer.
Finally, choosing severance creates a general remedy for other forms of
agency independence. Although hardly briefed, the Court chooses
severance without any specific considerations of the text, structure, or
purposes of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. By evaluating the issue in a cursory
fashion, the majority creates a sort of presumption in favor of severance for
invalid removal provisions. The remedy avoids the doomsday scenario of
abolishing the independent agencies altogether or halting their work.
Severance simply affects “the conditions under which those officers might
some day be removed,” but has “no effect” on the officers’ ability to
Decoupling agency independence from the
continue in office. 160
independent agencies creates a remedy that does not require restructuring
the executive branch, but brings its officers within the control and removal
authority of the President.
Other commentators have cited some of these factors as evidence of the
Court’s minimalism in this case. As discussed above, they have suggested
that the expansive constitutional principles in the opinion ring hollow in
light of the ultimate disposition; that leaving the SEC with removal power
over the Board reaffirms the constitutionality of the independent agencies;

158. Id. at 3161.
159. As Justice Breyer notes,
The Court then, by assumption, reads into the statute books a ‘for cause removal’
phrase that does not appear in the relevant statute and which Congress probably
did not intend to write. And it does so in order to strike down, not to uphold,
another statute. This is not a statutory construction that seeks to avoid a
constitutional question, but its opposite.
Id. at 3184 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
160. Id. at 3161.
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and that severance leads to a result that will have no real world change in
the Board’s operations.
Yet I find these factors point toward a reconsideration of the
constitutional imperative of the President’s unhampered removal power.
The Court stresses the importance of separation of powers, the vesting of
the executive power in the President, the responsibility of the President to
oversee executive branch officials, and the constitutional imperative of the
removal power for ensuring the President’s accountability. The majority
opinion strains to create a framework that accommodates these principles
yet leaves the Board intact. The principles established by the Court could
allow for the reexamination of the constitutionality of for-cause removal
restrictions. Whether the Court will push forward or draw back when faced
with a direct challenge to its precedents remains to be seen.
B.

The Severability Analysis in Future Cases

Although the Court’s severability approach seems well designed for one
layer of for-cause removal insulating the independent agencies, the Court
provides little guidance for how this analysis would apply in a future
decision. The issue was hardly briefed by the parties. In a short footnote at
the end of its brief, the Government simply noted that severing for-cause
removal provisions in the Act “would be far more consistent with
Congress’s intentions than any broader invalidation of the Act.”161 The
Government offered severability as a last-ditch solution preferable to
outright invalidation of the Board. The Government’s argument for
severing the for-cause provisions was little more than a suggestion—it did
not offer any evidence of congressional intent with respect to severability in
the Act’s text, structure, or purpose.
The Court adopts the remedy of severability but provides few details
about its application. The Court explains that, in general, upon finding a
part of a statute unconstitutional it will try to sever problematic portions of
a statute while leaving the remainder intact.162 With regard to the Board,
the Court finds severance of the for-cause removal provisions appropriate
because the “remaining provisions are not incapable of functioning
independently, and nothing in the statute’s text or historical context makes
it evident that Congress, faced with the limitations imposed by the
Constitution, would have preferred no Board at all to a Board whose
members are removable at will.” 163 The Court notes that this inquiry may
sometimes be “elusive,” but that congressional intent seems clear in this
case. 164
161. Brief for the United States at *52 n.20, Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting
Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010) (No. 08-861), 2009 WL 3290435.
162. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3161.
163. Id. at 3161–62 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
164. Id. at 3161 (citation omitted). With regard to other separation-of-powers decisions,
however, the Court sometimes has refused to sever an unconstitutional provision. For
example, in Bowsher v. Synar, the Court determined that the Comptroller General, an officer
removable by Congress, could not exercise executive powers, but that “striking the removal
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In future cases, presumably the Court will have to consider whether a
statutory scheme could remain operative without the removal protections
and also whether Congress would have intended to preserve the agency
even without its independence. But how will such an inquiry be made? In
Free Enterprise Fund, the Court does not examine the text of the Act, nor
does it consider any of the other indicators of congressional intent, such as
the structure, purpose, or historical context. Instead, the Court merely
asserts that no evidence can be found that makes it “evident” Congress
would have preferred invalidation to severing the unconstitutional for-cause
provisions. The inquiry is conclusory and does not aver to any specific
evidence.
One might surmise from the Court’s lack of discussion that in a
subsequent case, it will rarely be “evident” that Congress would prefer to
sacrifice an agency rather than sever its independence. Independent
agencies are often significant bureaucracies charged with carrying out
comprehensive statutory schemes. In light of this, one might expect that the
Court will hesitate to find that the independence of an agency would trump
Congress’s interest in having the agency at all. 165 This is especially true
given the strong presumption in favor of severability and the prevalence in
many statutes of severability provisions. In some cases, however, it might
be, as Justice Breyer points out, “the only available remedy to certain
double for-cause problems is to invalidate entire agencies.” 166
Nevertheless, in the context of the Board, the Court has suggested that
dismantling independent agencies is not the remedy of first choice, but
rather the Court can sever unconstitutional removal provisions and thereby
bring independent agencies under the control of the President.
C.

Some Further Implications

If the foregoing analysis is correct, then the Court in Free Enterprise
Fund has created a framework for challenging the constitutionality of
agency independence.
The Court sets out a proof that logically
demonstrates how the independent agencies contravene the constitutional
structure. Moreover, the Court provides a remedy that would allow the
Court to separate agency independence from the independent agencies by
severing for-cause removal provisions.
Given the likely resistance to overturning Humphrey’s Executor, if the
Court faces a challenge to one of the independent agencies, it may consider
in greater detail the statutory structure of the challenged agency. In Free
Enterprise Fund, Chief Justice Roberts accepts the parties’ stipulation that
the SEC Commissioners may be removed only for cause, although this is
provisions would lead to a statute that Congress would probably have refused to adopt.” 478
U.S. 714, 734–35 (1986).
165. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 933–35 (1983) (discussing the severability of the
one-house legislative veto held to be unconstitutional and relying on the statutory
severability provisions as well as the legislative history to conclude that the presumption in
favor of severability was not rebutted).
166. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3182 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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nowhere specified in the statute.167 In addition, no party challenged the
constitutional validity of Humphrey’s Executor and the first layer of forcause removal limits.
If such a challenge, however, were to be raised in a future case, the Court
may pay more attention to statutory questions about agency independence
in order to minimize disruption to these agencies.168 As a preliminary
matter, Humphrey’s Executor considered whether the Federal Trade
Commission Act’s for-cause removal grounds were exclusive. 169 The
statute did not provide any words of exclusivity, but the Court explained
that the text and structure of the statute led to the conclusion that such terms
were exclusive. 170 Similarly, in Free Enterprise Fund, the statute that
governed the Board did not expressly make its grounds for removal
exclusive. 171 The Court found the exclusivity implied because the statute
provided for removal for good cause shown and specified findings and
procedures for removal. This structure would not make sense “if Board
members could also be removed without any finding at all.”172 This
reasoning follows from the well-established precedent in Humphrey’s
Executor—for-cause removal provisions are generally read to be exclusive
grounds for removal even when the statute does not explicitly provide for
exclusivity.
Faced with a direct challenge to an independent agency, the Court may
decide to examine the specific statutory language more carefully,
particularly because the statutes governing the independent agencies differ.
In some instances, the removal limitations are simply assumed, as with the
SEC. Other statutes provide that removal may be had “for cause” without
stating the specific causes. 173 Some statutes list the specific grounds for
removal without any language of exclusivity; other statutes indicate that the
statutory causes are the exclusive ones.174 The statutory variation could be
examined in greater detail to see whether it corresponds to real differences
between the specific statutory schemes. The Court may decide to treat
these different formulations as meaningful variation between the statutes, or
may plausibly conclude that they are drafting differences of no consequence
167. See id. at 3182–84 (arguing that the majority simply assumes that SEC
Commissioners are removable “for cause” even though the statute is silent on this point and
the SEC statute was enacted between Myers and Humphrey’s Executor when such for-cause
removal provisions were thought to be unconstitutional).
168. See Miller, supra note 18, at 86 (arguing that statutes creating the independent
agencies may be saved through interpretation).
169. Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 610–11 (1935).
170. Id. at 611.
171. See Brief for the United States, supra note 161, at *51 n.19.
172. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3158 n.7.
173. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 242 (2006) (providing that members of the Federal Reserve
Board “shall hold office for a term of fourteen years from the expiration of the term of his
predecessor, unless sooner removed for cause by the President”).
174. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 41 (2006) (providing for the Federal Trade Commission that
“[a]ny Commissioner may be removed by the President for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or
malfeasance in office”), with 42 U.S.C. § 7171(b)(1) (2006) (providing for the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission that members “may be removed by the President only for
inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office”) (emphasis added).
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given the strong background understanding since Humphrey’s Executor that
limitations on the President’s removal power are read to be exclusive.
In a different vein, after Free Enterprise Fund, the President may seek to
test the limits of good cause removal by exercising greater control over
independent agencies and using removal if agency heads do not comply
with his directives. Perhaps the government will push to reconcile
presidential control with the statutory limits on removal by arguing for a
broader conception of what constitutes good cause. Questions about what
constitutes good cause remain relatively open because of the paucity of
challenges and decisions in this area. 175
Moreover, if the Court were to invalidate the removal protections for an
independent agency, and thereby overrule Humphrey’s Executor, the new
framework would shift the balance between the political branches.
Allowing full supervision by the President of the independent agencies
diminishes congressional control, at least to the extent that it bolsters
presidential control. One might expect that Congress will not sit quietly by
the sidelines if the Court shifts power over such agencies to the President
and thereby presumably diminishes some of Congress’s authority. Trying
to draw out the potential congressional responses is beyond the scope of
this Article.176 In any event, a judicial decision upsetting agency
independence would lead the political branches to compete for power under
this constitutional framework and it is difficult to predict how such
competition would play out between the branches.
CONCLUSION
Free Enterprise Fund answers a modest question about a federal agency
that enjoys a double layer of tenure protection. The Court determines that
the second layer goes too far—it diffuses the President’s oversight and
control beyond the Court’s precedents. The Court emphasizes formal
constitutional principles in the course of reaching this holding: the
President must oversee executive branch officers; such oversight requires
the removal power; and Congress cannot diminish or modify the removal
power. The decision sets forth a logical proof that leads to a limited
conclusion in this case, but its implications go beyond the Board and raise
questions about the constitutionality of even one layer of agency
independence. The opinion stresses throughout that a statute cannot prevent
the President from removing an officer he believes is not faithfully
executing the laws—a conclusion that logically implies the
unconstitutionality of agency independence. Whether, or in what fashion,
the Court applies its logic to the independent agencies remains to be seen.
175. See Miller, supra note 18, at 86–87.
176. One can, however, imagine some possibilities. Threatened by the expansion of
presidential authority over these agencies, Congress might seek to restructure the duties or
obligations of the independent agencies—it could reduce their authority and power, but
rolling back the administrative state may prove politically and practically difficult. More
plausibly, Congress might try to redirect control over these agencies through appropriations
and the exercise of its oversight authority.

